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Learning from the Process of Decision:
The Parenting Plan∗
Francis J. Catania, Jr.∗∗
I. INTRODUCTION
In her recent overview of women’s rights and family law,1 Herma
Hill Kay succinctly characterizes the divorce reform movement of the
1960s, the “full-scale campaign to reverse the no-fault revolution”
that accompanied the twenty-fifth anniversary of the first no-fault divorce statute,2 and the continuing debate as academics line up on either side of the issue.3 She concludes that “the landscape of family
law reform” will continue to be dominated by such debates well into
the present century,4 ending on a hopeful note that acknowledges
the complexity of moral issues and the breadth of passionate opinion
and belief while urging continued exploration and consolidation of
valued reforms.5 Though I expect that many would disagree with
Professor Kay’s feminist characterizations, there is undeniable value
in the bold strokes of her article. They present a manageable and accessible overview of some of the great tensions that inspire and inform modern family law and their histories. These same great tensions can be said to have inspired and informed the American Law
Institute’s (“ALI”) Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution
(“Principles”) and even to be inspiring the founding question of the
symposium for which this article was prepared: Do the ALI Princi∗ This article was presented at the Symposium on the ALI Family Dissolution Principles, held at Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law School on February 1, 2001.
∗∗ Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law, B.A. 1973, Dickinson College; M.A., 1976, The Johns Hopkins University; J.D., 1983, The Dickinson School of
Law. Thanks, for continuing inspiration regarding the wonders of the parent-child relationship, to my parents and children.
1. See Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of
Women’s Rights and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CAL.
L. REV. 2017 (2000).
2. Id. at 2081–82.
3. Id. at 2081.
4. Id. at 2091.
5. Id. at 2092–93.
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ples tend to strengthen or deconstruct families?
Two authors cited in the Kay article, and the lines attributed to
them, provide insight into the ongoing divorce debate from somewhere near its poles. Professor Katherine Shaw Spaht writes of nofault divorce laws as having “played an indispensable role in the neardestruction of marriage.”6 Professor Ira Mark Ellman writes that
proposed counterreforms are likely to “increase the number of marriages that are, at any given time, legally intact but factually dead, to
keep many victims of failed marriages from building new lives for
themselves and their children, and perhaps to increase the proportion
of children born out of wedlock.”7
Professor Ellman’s mention of divorcing spouses who are “building new lives for themselves” refers to the “clean break” theory,
which flourished in the no-fault “revolution.” The doctrine “assumes
that both members of a divorcing couple are better off if they can cut
ties with one another and start their lives afresh.”8 It is no coincidence that both Professors Spaht and Ellman refer to the children of
dissolving marriages in the quotations above.9 The “interests” of
children of divorce is one of the main rallying points for argument
about no-fault divorce. While the “clean break” theory developed in
response to property considerations at divorce, it was soon perceived
as permeating all aspects of no-fault divorce.10 The idea of a “clean
break” between spouses divorcing upon the realization—either consensual or unilateral—that their marriage is irretrievably broken (regardless of potential claims of marital fault) seemed to be a Gordian

6. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and Legal Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 63, 69–70 (1998), quoted in Kay, supra note 1, at 2083.
7. See Ira Mark Ellman, The Misguided Movement to Revive Fault Divorce, and Why
Reformers Should Look Instead to The American Law Institute, 11 INT’L J.L. POL. & FAM.
216, 225 (1997), quoted in Kay, supra note 1, at 2082.
8. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 809, 846 (1998).
9. Professor Spaht quotes Paul Amato and Alan Booth, whom she describes as “two
left-of-center authors” posing a cost-benefit analysis that brings children squarely into the divorce equation: “Spending one-third of one’s life living in a marriage that is less than satisfactory in order to benefit children—children that parents elected to bring into the world—is not
an unreasonable expectation.” Spaht, supra note 6, at 66–67 (quoting PAUL A. AMATO &
ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN AN ERA OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL 238
(1997)).
10. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and Property
Rhetoric, 82 GEO. L.J. 2303, 2313–18 (1994); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1241 (1998).
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knot-cutter of an idea in the 1970s, against a background of decades
of bitter litigation over marital fault and the unseemly institutionalization of collusion among matrimonial lawyers and judges,11 and in
the rosy glow of emerging social and legal norms of racial and gender equality and individual privacy and autonomy. Whatever sense
the “clean break” theory made in the allocation of property and income in the aftermath of divorce, its effect on families with children
only began to be noticed later. Parents were sorted by child custody
laws into fairly rigid categories of “custodial parents” (an approximation of the parental ideal from the intact family—with, perhaps, excessive expectations on individual parents) and “noncustodial parents” (parents—most often fathers—who exercised the lesser share of
custodial and perhaps decisionmaking responsibility; parents with
whom the children were not “at home”). Social scientists observed
the increasingly common phenomenon of noncustodial parents’ estrangement from their children. This appeared to be at least one explanation for the shockingly bad child support statistics in the United
States through the seventies and eighties.12 Of even more concern
11. See Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction of Norms: Social Norms and the
Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901, 1940 (2000); Jane C. Murphy, Rules,
Responsibility and Commitment to Children: The New Language of Morality in Family Law,
60 U. PITT. L. REV. 1111, 1175 (1999).
12. See Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76
VA. L. REV. 9, 36 (1990). Examples of such statistics follow:
• From 1970 to 1981, the number of divorces in America doubled.
• From 1970 to 1981, the number of children living with only one parent
increased by 54 percent to 12.6 million, one of every five children in
America.
• Of the 4 million women who were owed child support in 1981, only 47
percent received the full amount due, and 28 percent received absolutely
nothing; the aggregate amount of child support payments due in 1981
was $9.9 billion, but only $6.1 billion was actually received.
• From 1970 to 1981, the average amount of child support received by
mothers rose from $1,800 to $2,110 per child, but after adjusting for inflation, the payments actually decreased by 16 percent in real terms.
• In 1982, only 15 percent of divorced or separated women were awarded
alimony, and only 43 percent of those women actually received full payment of the alimony they were owed, meaning that child support is the
only form of assistance most divorced women can expect from their exhusbands.
• Between 1970 and 1981, the number of people in families below the
poverty level that were headed by women rose by 54 percent, while the
number of male-headed poor families decreased by 50 percent.
• In 1981, women headed almost 50 percent of all the poor families in
America.
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were studies that indicated that noncustodial parents were losing
touch altogether in their relationships with their children,13 leading
to the growing perception that, for many fathers, “marriage and parenthood are a package deal. Their ties to their children, and their
feelings of responsibility for their children, depend on their ties to
their wives. . . . [I]f the marriage breaks up, the . . . ties between fathers and children are also broken.”14
Legal scholars have speculated that this kind of de facto rationale, borne of the “clean break” theory, undermines social and legal
norms of parental commitment.15 This social and legal dislocation
coincided with a fascinating, if problematic, moment in the evolution
of modern family law. The “best interests of the child” standard has
been widely touted as the standard by which child custody disputes
are adjudicated in the United States since the nineteenth century.
The standard was certainly an improvement over ancient propertybased approaches to child custody.16 It had seemed an adequate, if
less than elegant, standard when viewed through the prism of maternal preference rules. By the latter part of the twentieth century, however, the “best interests” standard was proving to be maddeningly
indeterminate, as gender preferences were found unconstitutional or
were simply dropped in an era of raised consciousness about gender
equality.17 Thus, the prospect of litigation involving expensive lawyers and experts as hired-gun character assassins further undermined
the relationships of families involved in child custody disputes.
Professor Elizabeth Scott, in her influential article Rational Decisionmaking About Divorce,18 writes about the social norms that underlie parenting. For many people, she argues, “[t]he value of chil-

See JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, CHILD SUPPORT IN AMERICA 11 (1986) (citing BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, NO. 130, POPULATION PROFILE OF THE UNITED
STATES (1982)).
13. See FRANK F. FURSTENBERG & ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES: WHAT
HAPPENS WHEN PARENTS PART 35 (1991).
14. Id. at 118.
15. See Scott, supra note 12, at 36.
16. See Bartlett, supra note 8, at 849. “Although the prevailing best-interests-of-thechild standard expresses the right societal message about the responsibility of parents to put
their children’s interests first, the standard is not determinate enough to produce predictable
results.” Id.
17. See Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Devine v.
Devine, 398 So. 2d 686 (Ala. 1981); Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986).
18. See supra note 12.
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dren in a life plan is both basic and complex; it derives from a desire
to pass on a cultural and personal heritage, to instill values, skills, and
interests, and to enjoy the companionship of persons sharing a
unique and insoluble bond.”19 She goes on to suggest that the profundity of the parent-child relationship in the lives of most parents
would support “[a] regime that encourages long and careful consideration about the decision to divorce by parents of minor children,”20 and that such a regime in the law of marriage and divorce
“would reflect broadly shared societal values.”21 The regime she proposes would involve precommitments to substantial mandatory delay
periods for parents seeking divorce who have minor children,22 more
substantial child and spousal support obligations,23 property distribution schemes that would be beneficial to minor children of the marriage,24 and possibly requirements of counseling, mediation, or mental health evaluation of the children before a divorce would be
permitted.25 The fundamental premise of her proposal is that “[b]y
imposing additional costs on divorce, precommitments also would
indirectly encourage cooperative behavior during marriage and promote more careful consideration of the decision to marry.”26 Professor Scott emphasized that “a regime of mandatory rules promoting
commitment to marriage is justified only to protect the interest of
minor children.”27 She argued that “the sense of moral responsibility
to one’s own children continues to be important to most persons”28
and that, therefore, “many would be willing to accept a greater risk
of error in the application of precommitment theory in pursuit of the
objective of protecting the welfare of their children.”29
More than a decade after Professor Scott’s brave proposal, the
debate about whether easy access to divorce is undermining the family roars on. Professor Scott may have underestimated the degree to

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

Id. at 25.
Id. at 89.
Id.
Id. at 91.
Id.
Scott, supra note 12, at 91.
Id.
Id. at 38.
Id. at 94 (emphasis added).
Id. at 91.
Id.
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which attempts to alter the availability of divorce would inspire those
for whom personal liberty is more important than relationship values,
or the degree to which the prospect of continuing in a marriage “legally intact but factually dead”30 holds more fear and loathing than
that of raising children with an estranged co-parent. She may have
overestimated the degree to which even earnest and highly motivated
parents would be willing to risk a precommitment regime, given
some of the potential problems with such a regime that she acknowledges.31 But her premise—that a sense of moral responsibility to
one’s own children is a broadly shared societal value—is reflected in
chapter 2 of the ALI Principles—and in a context in which consensus
about what that sense can achieve in the best interests of children
generally is perhaps more likely.
The past fifteen years have seen a spirited reexamination of child
custody law and have resulted in trends and countertrends as state
legislatures attempt to come to terms with the realities of childcustody disputes. First, the notion of parents sharing child custody
equally (or near equally) swept the nation. Newspapers, magazines,
and television documentaries ran stories of children going home to a
different household on alternating weeks or parents taking turns living with the children in the designated custodial home.32 In reaction
came studies and articles challenging the effectiveness of joint custody.33 Next came the primary caretaker doctrine, with the attractive

30. See Ellman, supra note 7, at 225, quoted in Kay, supra note 1, at 2082.
31. See Scott, supra note 12, at 56.
32. See, e.g., Dorothy Anderson, Joint Custody Ensures Neither Mom’s Nor Dad’s
Role Ends With Divorce, CHI TRIB., Jan. 8, 1986, at 12; Nadine Brozan, When Children
Have 2 Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1984, at 598; Linda Bird Francke et al., The Children
of Divorce, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 11, 1980, at 58; Ted Gest et al., Divorce: How the Game is
Played Now, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 21, 1983, at 39; Aric Press et al., Divorce
American Style, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 10, 1983, at 42; Denise M. Topolnicki, Love and Money,
MONEY, Apr. 1982, at 176; Diane Wagner, Two Families Adjust to New Routines, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 27, 1981, at C19.
33. See, e.g., Kenneth K. Berry & Deborah Karras, Custody Evaluations: A Critical Review, 16 PROF. PSYCHOL.: RES. & PRAC. 76 (1985); Alan Carlson et al., Child Custody Decisions: A Survey of Judges, 23 FAM. L.Q. 75 (1989); Richard Chasin, M.D. & Henry Grunebaum, M.D., A Model for Evaluation in Child Custody Disputes, 9 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 43
(1981); Carol R. Lowery, The Wisdom of Solomon: Criteria for Child Custody from the Legal
and Clinical Points of View, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 371 (1984); Andrew P. Musetto, The
Role of the Mental Health Professional in Contested Custody: Evaluator of Competence or
Facilitator of Change?, 4 J. DIVORCE 69 (1981); see also Ted Gest, Feminizing the Law: The
New Meaning of Equality, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 17, 1991, at 48; LynNell Hancock, Putting Working Moms in Custody, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 13, 1995, at 54; Judith Regan,
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premise that many of the pains and uncertainties of child custody decisionmaking could be avoided by presumptively basing custodial
and decisionmaking responsibilities upon the history of parent-child
relationships while the family was intact. Again, there was a wave of
scholarship and some legislation that embraced the idea, followed by
a wave of criticism. Today, a small number of states have some type
of preference for joint custody arrangements, while a slightly smaller
number explicitly disfavor such arrangements.34 And while only one
state uses a primary caretaker presumption, a number of states explicitly require courts to consider past caretaking in making custody determinations.35
II. CHAPTER 2 OBJECTIVES
Chapter 2 of the ALI Principles—the principles concerning the
“Allocation of Custodial and Decisionmaking Responsibilities for
Children”—is the latest manifestation of this long and thorough inquiry, and it has the potential to be a culmination. Chapter 2 is the
result of careful examination of the custody laws of the states, past
and present, as well as scholarly studies and proposals from the
United States and abroad. The Reporter36 has taken great care in setting objectives37 for the chapter, which are designed to avoid polarizing debate and yet promise to right some of the most ineffective or
counterproductive aspects of child custody law.
The objectives break down into three essential categories: (1)
improving determinacy and predictability in the law of custodial and
decisionmaking responsibility; (2) respecting and enhancing family
autonomy by maximizing the effects of choices made by family

An Open Letter to Mr. Clark, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 13, 1995, at 57; Jan Hofmann, Joint Custody: It’s Not Easy on Divorced Couples or Children, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1989, at 7; Nick
Sheff, My Turn: My Long-Distance Life, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 15, 1999, at 16; Stephanie Simon,
Joint Custody Loses Favor for Increasing Children’s Feeling of Being Torn Apart, WALL ST. J.,
July 15, 1991, at B1; David Streitfeld, Jury is Still Out on Question of Joint Custody; Often
Not Feasible Because of Legal, Geographical and Emotional Roadblocks, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
12, 1986, at 5B.
34. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS, § 2.09 cmt. a, at 152 (Tentative Draft No. 3 Part I, March 20, 1998)
[hereinafter PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I)].
35. Id. § 2.09, at 153–58.
36. Katharine T. Bartlett has served as the Reporter since 1994, and Grace Ganz Blumberg served in 1993 and 1995.
37. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.02, at 23–29.
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members, not by the court or the state; and (3) codifying and institutionalizing fairness concerning race, ethnicity, sex, religion, sexual
orientation, sexual conduct, economic circumstances, and functional
relationships.

A. Improving Determinacy and Predictability of the Law of
Custodial and Decisionmaking Responsibility
There seems to be consensus that the “best interests of the
child” standard is a conundrum to parents, lawyers, and judges
alike.38 Absent the predictability afforded by the maternal preference
standards of the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, and
with little or no guidance provided to courts by equally mystified (or
politically hamstrung) legislatures, custody adjudication under the
“best interests” standard has been almost universally excoriated for
its indeterminacy.39 In 1975, Professor Robert Mnookin made the
provocative suggestion that a coin flip to determine custodial and
decisionmaking responsibilities might be just as informed40 as the
typical “best interests” adjudication, and would probably be more
fair,41 less expensive, more expeditious, less painful to the parties and
children, and could even have a positive effect upon private negotiations between the parties.42 Professor Mnookin went on to state:
38. Id. § 2.02 cmt. c, at 32. The author participated in a panel discussion before the
Family Court Section of the Pennsylvania State Trial Judges’ Conference in February of 1994,
in which the frustration of a number of judges with the standard they were asked to apply in
child custody cases was expressed by one judge in a tearful plea for help and by another in a
red-faced tirade.
39. The reporter cites the “classic critiques of the best-interest-of-the-child test” as including Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond the Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child
Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota’s Four Year Experiment with the Primary
Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427, 499–500 (1990). See PRINCIPLES (Tentative
Draft No. 3, pt. I), Introduction, at 2 & n.3, supra note 34; Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments:
Against the Best Interests of the Child, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1987); Martha Fineman,
Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988); Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in
Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165, 1181 (1986); Robert
H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce,
88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226 (1975).
40. “Individualized adjudication (under a ‘best interests’ standard) means that the result
will often turn on a largely intuitive evaluation based on unspoken values and unproven predictions.” Mnookin, supra note 39, at 289.
41. Each possible outcome would have an equal chance regardless of race, gender, etc.
42. See Mnookin, supra note 39, at 290.
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“While judgments about what is best for the child may currently be
beyond our capacity in many cases, this need not be true in fifty
years. Movement toward better judgment implies, however, that
judges and decision-makers as a group learn from the process of decision.”43 Half of those fifty years have now elapsed. The publication
of chapter 2 of the ALI Principles gives us a natural vantage point
from which to evaluate what we have learned in some twenty-five
years. It gives us the opportunity to ask whether the proposals in
chapter 2 are based upon what we have learned from the process of
decision and whether they are likely to strengthen or weaken families.
For purposes of this inquiry, the “process of decision” is defined
as the whole legal and social system concerned with parental relationships with children, including (1) decisions to be made by individuals considering parenting, (2) decisions to be made by parents
considering ending their intimate relationship with one another, (3)
decisions to be made by estranged parents about parenting, and (4)
decisions to be made by courts in the event of impasse between estranged parents of a child. The “process of decision” will also be
considered as the behavioral science of decisionmaking; it is particularly useful for the insights it provides into the problem of cooperation and its application to parenting.
After twenty-five years, it is clear that we have learned some
things from the process of decision. One is that parents (and individuals considering parenthood) will be unable to make informed
and considered choices about their relationships with their children
and with each other as long as the decisionmaking process continues
to be (1) indeterminate, (2) subject to the whims and biases of decisionmakers outside the family, (3) subject to poor information about
the intentions of the other members of the family, and, therefore, (4)
unpredictable.44 Another lesson learned from the process of decision
is that predictable decisionmaking requires clear, determinate, and
easily-applied rules.45 We have learned that parental agreement is,
generally speaking, good for children and that it is difficult for courts
to improve measurably on parental agreements about parental deci-

43. Id. at 291.
44. See Scott, supra note 12, at 13. “Research in decision theory suggests that cognitive
biases, haste, and poor information may cause decisionmaking error.” Id.
45. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, at 1.
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sionmaking and caretaking.46 We have learned that greater predictability is achieved through structured, yet highly individualized, decisionmaking principles.47 We have learned that preserving existing
child-parent attachments after the breakup of a family unit is critical
to a child’s well-being.48 And we have learned that any decisionmaking process will need qualifications or exceptions to protect against
unacceptable results.49
In Professor Carl Schneider’s terms, an indeterminate system of
laws is not exercising its facilitative, expressive, channeling, or even
its arbitral functions properly.50 In the case of the law of child custody, the system is not reliably usable to give legal effect to the private arrangements of parents concerning custodial and decisionmaking responsibilities for their children (facilitative). It is not reliably
usable to provide a voice in which parents may speak about their relationships with their children and each other (expressive). It is not
reliably usable to create or support social institutions to serve desirable ends51 (channeling). And it is not even reliably usable to help
resolve people’s disputes (arbitral).52

B. Respecting and Enhancing Family Autonomy
The Reporter writes, in the Introductory Discussion of chapter
2, about the importance of developing rules for allocating responsibility for children that are predictable, so as to “facilitate thoughtful
planning by cooperative parents while minimizing the harm to
children caught in a cycle of conflict.”53 The expressive,54
46. Id. at 10.
47. Id.
48. Id. § 2.02, at 26.
49. Id. at xxv, 11–13.
50. See Carl E. Schneider, The Channeling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 495, 497–98 (1992).
51. One example is defined role expectations for what have come to be known as “noncustodial” parents, and for stepparents.
52. Mnookin and Kornhauser use a medical analogy to question whether many legal
disputes are “iatrogenic”—that is, induced and created by lawyers who are ostensible problem
solvers. They conclude that little is known about the extent to which legal representation facilitates dispute settlement and the extent to which it hinders dispute settlement. Mnookin &
Kornhauser, supra note 39, at 986.
53. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, at 1 (emphasis added).
Professor Schneider points out that the institutions of family law “offer people models for organizing their lives.” Schneider, supra note 50, at 507. When these models “have presumably
worked for many other people,” they come to be “part of a menu of social choice.” Id. Of the
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channeling,55 and arbitral56 benefits of predictable rules are clear as
well. Another thing that we have learned about the process of decision, as the Reporter acknowledges, is the tension between the objective of predictability across the broad range of custodial circumstances and the need for decisionmaking that is individualized to
each family’s circumstances.57 The objective of respecting and enhancing family autonomy by maximizing the effects of choices made
by family members follows quite logically from the objective of improving predictability and determinacy. There is a time-honored tradition in the United States of placing “broad and near-absolute”58
responsibility and authority in parents in intact families for the care
and custody of their children.59 When a relationship between parents
essence of such an institutional facilitative and channeling function is predictability.
54. Professor Bartlett wrote in 1988 of a system in which parents would participate “in
the creation of their own meanings [of their own relationships with their children] and further
public meanings of responsibility in parenthood.” Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 326 (1988). In a dispute resolution system that expresses important
social values in its words and in the ways that it acts, parents can predict the effect on the reordering of their own family and react accordingly. Bartlett predicts that “[a]s more of these discussions take place, our understanding of what should matter will evolve and, hopefully, improve. While this process may lack the simplicity and administrability we prefer, it appropriately
reflects the complex values and tensions that questions about parenthood entail.” Id.
55. Referring to channeling, one commentator has stated:
The channeling function helps tell the people involved in an institution, the world in
general, and the law in particular that those people stand in a particular relation to
each other. When people marry, they, the world, and the law know that they have
assumed special obligations to each other. . . . When a child is born in wedlock, the
parents, the child (eventually), the world, and the law know that the parents have
taken on special responsibilities to their child.
Schneider, supra note 50, at 520. While Professor Schneider uses these words to make the
point that a key tool of the channeling function is the disadvantaging of alternatives to the institution being promoted, the point is that the channeling function is effective only if the
norms are clear and the consequences of adhering to them or ignoring them predictable.
56. Id. at 507. Schneider uses marriage as an example of the importance of having a dispute resolution function that “provid[es] rules and a forum in which to adjudicate . . . disputes” and “provides norms of behavior which may help the parties resolve some of their disputes privately.” Id.
57. Simply put, “responsiveness to individualized circumstances requires judicial discretion, but this discretion can undermine uniformity and predictability of results.” PRINCIPLES
(Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, at 1; see also id. § 2.02 cmt. c, at 32–35.
58. Id. at 5.
59. The Reporter observes that “the primary importance of the family in private lives, as
well as its significance in U.S. constitutional case law, is reflected in the very limited degree of
official oversight and control over . . . its internal relationships.” Id., Introduction (I)(e), at 7.
The Reporter cites to Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158 (1944); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) in support of this obser-
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begins to dissolve, however, the principle of family autonomy is on
much shakier ground. Indeed, as the Reporter observes, in most
states the laws require judicial review of any agreement between estranged parents concerning child support or child custody.60 The
need for such review is obvious, but the substitution of the discretion of the court—with its limited fact-finding ability and its immanent biases—for the nuanced understanding of family dynamics inherent to each family member is too often less than optimal. Thus,
the Reporter set out in chapter 2 to resort as much as possible to the
committed relationship that likely exists between parents and their
children,61 while acknowledging the importance of the protective
function of the judicial presence in the process.62

C. Codifying and Institutionalizing Fairness
Of the main objectives of chapter 2, the pursuit of fairness in
such matters as race, religion, sexual orientation, sexual conduct,
economic circumstances, and functional relationships has, of course,
the greatest potential for controversy. “Law typically follows, rather
than leads, social change,” observes Professor Kay.63 And family law
has followed (sometimes helping, sometimes hindering) a trend of
social change as the twentieth century progressed toward a more
egalitarian society. Some egalitarian developments of the last century
appear to be beyond question or challenge.64 Others are the object
of intense and sophisticated debate.65 While there is widespread acceptance of the notion of limits on government discrimination on
the basis of gender, there is also a broad and persistent mistrust of
two ideas: (1) that traditional gender roles should be eliminated, and
vation.
60. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.07 cmt. a, at 85.
61. Id., Introduction (II)(b), at 10.
62. Schneider says “[o]ne of law’s most basic duties is to protect citizens against harms
done them by other citizens.” Schneider, supra note 50, at 497.
63. See Kay, supra note 1, at 2091.
64. See, e.g., Palmore v. Disoti, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) (concerning racial discrimination); see also Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979); Craig v.
Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971); Devine v. Devine, 398 So.
2d 686 (Ala. 1981) (concerning gender discrimination).
65. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (concerning grandparent custodial
rights); Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996) (concerning same-sex marriage); see generally PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, ch. 2 (addressing custody for
de facto parents and parents by estoppel); see also id. ch. 6 (addressing domestic partnerships).
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(2) that traditional gender roles should be preserved.66 The Reporter
points out that the emerging trend in the law of custodial and decisionmaking responsibility for children is to prohibit discrimination
on these bases in the decisionmaking process, noting that such discrimination usually reflects prejudices in the system and its participants.67 In fact, the Principles explicitly codify prohibitions on basing
custodial decisions on race, ethnicity, sex, religion, sexual orientation, extramarital sexual conduct, or economic circumstances.68 The
Reporter does not presume that the Principles, where adopted, will
effectively end such discrimination in the application of these laws,
cognizant as she is of the subtlety of the stereotypes involved.69 But
she emphasizes that the basis for provisions in the Principles codifying and institutionalizing fairness and equality is that the biases addressed too often take the place of “a rational assessment of the
child’s welfare.”70 As an example, she cites the treatment of the sexual orientations of parents in custody decisionmaking. She acknowledges the controversy surrounding this issue, but points out that the
debate, while considerable, is a moral debate and one that need not
apply to the pressing question of the caretaking and decisionmaking
on behalf of a particular child. The relevant moral question, if there
is one, is of the well-being of the particular child.71 The Reporter
takes the position that the debate over the morality of the various
sexual orientations can be moved away from the custody decisionmaking process by limiting that process to the more scientific question of parental conduct and demonstrable harm to the child. Standards for homosexual conduct and heterosexual conduct are treated
identically in the Principles, under the heading of “extramarital sexual conduct.”72 This is another filter designed to keep the more subtle biases out of the decisionmaking process. The same approach is
taken with religious practices73 (as distinguished from religious beliefs)—again as a matter of conduct. A similar but slightly different

66. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475, 500
(1999) (cited in Kay, supra note 1, at 2091).
67. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, at 15.
68. Id.; see also § 2.14.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. See Bartlett, supra note 8, at 853.
72. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.14(1)(e).
73. Id. § 2.14(1)(c).
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approach is taken with economic discrimination.74 The emphasis on
distinguishing conduct/actual harm from orientation/belief is underscored by a passage in chapter 2 that expressly permits a court to
consider any parent’s ability to care for a child, including the ability
to meet the child’s needs for a positive self-image, regardless of a
parent’s race, ethnicity, sex, religion, sexual orientation, sexual conduct, or economic circumstances.75
III. THE PARENTING PLAN
At the core of chapter 2 of the ALI Principles is an attempt at reversing the trend toward the clean break as a social norm in child
custody dispute resolution: Topic 2—The Parenting Plan.76 By placing this concept at the core, the Reporter institutionalizes the premise that “the preservation of existing child-parent attachments after
the breakup of a family unit is a critical factor in the child’s wellbeing,”77 and that “each parent ordinarily will play an important ongoing role in the child’s life.”78
Professor Bartlett has indicated that, in her view, the failure of
the joint custody and primary caretaker presumptions to take hold in
the law of child custody is in large part due to the fact that each of
those roles “assumes some ideal norm for all post-divorce families.”79
In some jurisdictions, that norm has been preference for joint custody: parents of a particular child have shared—and would continue
to share—all custodial responsibilities for the child. In other jurisdictions, that norm has been primary caretaker: one parent or the other
was—and would continue to be—the primary caretaker of the child.
Again, these approaches are susceptible to disputes pertaining to who
will possess and control the child, and how. The Principles require
that each parent “seeking a judicial allocation[80] of custodial respon-

74. Id. § 2.14(1)(f).
75. Id. § 2.14(2).
76. Id. § 2.06 cmt. a, at 66. “The parenting plan is a core concept of this chapter.” Id.
77. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, at 27. The Reporter goes
on to note that “[s]uch attachments are thought to affect the child’s sense of identity and later
ability to trust and to form healthy relationships.” Id.
78. Id., Introduction, at 8–9.
79. See Bartlett, supra note 8, at 851–52.
80. Note that the language here seems to miss an opportunity to encourage parental
negotiation and agreement, instead envisioning an impasse that must be resolved by adjudication.
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sibility or decisionmaking responsibility”81 file a proposed parenting
plan with the court.82 The proposed plans are to be supported by
disclosing information (“to the extent known or reasonably discoverable” by the parties), in affidavit form,83 concerning the caretaking
and other parenting responsibilities performed by each parent during
the preceding twenty-four-month period, as well as child-care schedules, school and extracurricular activities, and parental work schedules.84 Once the proposed parenting plans are on the table, the Principles give strong preference to voluntary agreements between the
parties.85 In fact, the parties are explicitly told that they may file a
joint plan.86 The rationale here is that “parental agreement is, generally speaking, good for children, and that it is difficult for courts to
accomplish meaningful review that is likely to improve measurably
those agreements.”87
Chapter 2 also entails a change in the terminology of child custody law by which the Reporter hopes to express “the ordinary expectation that both parents have meaningful responsibilities for their
child at divorce.”88 This focus on what may seem to be a semantic
detail is an indication of the importance the Reporter has placed
on—to quote from a 1988 article by Professor Bartlett—the “structure and expressive meanings of the law—especially the kind of arguments the law urges the participants to make, and the construction
of the parent-child relationship (and the concept of “the good parent”) those arguments foster.”89
In chapter 2, the terms “physical custody,” “partial custody,”
“visitation,” and the like are replaced with “custodial responsibility,”
and the term “legal custody” is replaced with “decisionmaking re-

81. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.06(1). Note the use
of the term “allocation” rather than “award.”
82. Id.
83. This is presumably to underscore the importance of truthfulness. Note the verification requirements in some state plans. See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 452.377 (West Supp.
2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-220 (1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.09.194 (West
1997).
84. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.06(1).
85. Id. at 10.
86. Id. § 2.06(1).
87. Id. at 10; see also Bartlett, supra note 8, at 851.
88. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, Introduction, at 9.
89. See Bartlett, supra note 54, at 294–95.
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sponsibility.”90 The rationale for these changes is the prospect of “reconstruct[ing] the nature of disputes over children from who will
possess and control the children”—a conceptualization redolent of
the property regime from which clean break theory stems—“to what
adjustments in family roles will be most appropriate for the child.”91
In further acceptance of the notion that family members know
best the dynamics of their own relationships, the parenting plan provisions avoid “empirical and normative assumptions about the family,” such as the joint custody or primary caretaker presumptions.92
Instead, custodial responsibility93 is allocated to each parent in approximate proportion to that parent’s share of such responsibility
while the family was intact. This idea of approximation of allocation
of custodial responsibility, in addition to expressing deference to the
idea of each parent’s ongoing role in the child’s family,94 is designed
to do two things. First, it sets the scene for “structured, yet highly
individualized decisionmaking,”95 in service of the objective of increased predictability. And second, it helps to create an environment
for constructive negotiation between parents about what adjustments
to their roles in the child’s family will be most appropriate.96 That
environment gains stability in the shadow cast by the more structured and predictable decisionmaking process, as well as from the

90. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, Introduction, at 9;
see also id. §§ 2.06(1), 2.09, and 2.10. The term “custodial responsibility” refers to “the
child’s living arrangements, including with whom the child lives and when, and any periods of
time during which another person is scheduled by the court to have caretaking responsibility
for the child.” Id. at 110. The term “decisionmaking responsibility” refers to “the authority to
make decisions with respect to significant areas in the child’s life.” Id. at 187. This includes,
typically, education and health care. It may also include “permission to enlist in the military,
drive a car, work, participate in school sports, and sign a contract.” Id.
91. Id., Introduction, at 9.
92. Bartlett, supra note 8, at 852 (emphasis added).
93. Responsibility for the child’s living arrangements, including with whom the child
lives and when and any periods of time during which another person is scheduled by the court
to have caretaking responsibility for the child.
94. The Reporter credits Professor Elizabeth S. Scott with being the first advocate of an
approximation standard for allocating child custody. See PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3,
pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.09 cmt. b.
95. Id. at 10.
96. ANDREW J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 85 (1981). “[A]fter
divorce, mother, father, and children may all have a different conception of who is in their immediate family” and “one can no longer define ‘the family’ . . . except in relation to a particular person.” Id.
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explicit expressions of preference for voluntary agreement.97
Supplementing and enhancing the parenting plan provisions in
section 2.06, the Principles address allocation of significant decisionmaking responsibility (the former “legal custody”) with an explicit preference for resolution by agreement of the parents.98 They
go on to assert what can be called a mild presumption in favor of
joint decisionmaking responsibility “if both parents have been exercising a reasonable share of parenting functions.”99 The effect, again,
is to use the concept of approximation to lend structure to the decisionmaking process while presenting a stable environment for negotiation in light of the steadily expressed norm that the family revolve
around each parent’s relationship with the child.
An important aspect of improving predictability in the custody
decisionmaking process involves addressing the tension between the
need for finality in child custody arrangements and the need for
flexibility as a child’s needs and parents’ circumstances change over
time.100 Typically, little attention is paid to the inevitability of such
change in child custody orders. In fact, the laws of a number of
states come down heavily on the side of lending stability to a child’s
living arrangements by putting firm limits—even moratoria—on the
possibility of modification once an order is set.101 In the context of
the parenting plan, the Principles set out to encourage parents to anticipate changes in their child’s needs and in their circumstances and
to establish means for addressing these changes in advance without
resorting to relitigation in court.102 In keeping with the preference
for voluntary agreements in the Principles, any dispute resolution
procedure that the parents can agree upon should be ordered by the
court unless the agreement is not knowing or voluntary or would be
harmful to the child.103
In the event that the parents cannot agree on a dispute resolution procedure, the Principles give great deference to the parents’ respective preferences and circumstances, while providing that a court
97. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.06(1).
98. Id. § 2.10(1).
99. Id. at 13.
100. Id. at 3–5.
101. Id. § 2.18 cmt. a.
102. Id. at 8; § 2.11. The Principles also provide for court-ordered parenting services to
facilitate the dispute resolution process. See id. § 2.08.
103. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.07(1).
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may order a nonjudicial dispute resolution procedure.104 An entire
section of chapter 2 is devoted to limiting the dispute resolution
process in the event of child abuse, neglect, or abandonment; domestic abuse; drug, alcohol, or other substance abuse that interferes
with caretaking;105 or persistent interference with the other parent’s
access to the child.106 Furthermore, another subsection in chapter 2
holds that a court should not require a parent to participate in any
dispute resolution procedure that would require face-to-face meetings with the other parent.107 These two provisions are designed to
protect against eventual agreements that are coercive rather than
truly voluntary.108
The Principles next address the tension between the desirability
of private ordering by the parties and the possible need for judicial
exercise of the protective function109 by distinguishing dispute resolution “procedures that have been agreed to in advance by the parents from those that have been imposed by the court.”110 A decision
reached by parents through a nonjudicial dispute resolution procedure that they have agreed upon in advance is binding upon the parents and must be enforced by the court unless it is harmful to the
child, beyond the scope of the agreement on procedure, or the result
of fraud, misconduct, corruption, or other serious irregularity.111 A
decision reached by parents through a nonjudicial dispute resolution
procedure ordered by the court and without parental agreement is
subject to de novo review by the court.112 Thus, the parenting plan
process as envisioned in the Principles sets forth a combination of (1)
expressions of preference for voluntary agreements between parents,
(2) channeling of parents who are able to agree upon a nonjudicial
dispute resolution procedure into a structured decisionmaking process that preserves and enhances the autonomy of the child’s family,
and (3) facilitating guarantees that agreements on both process and

104. Id. § 2.11(2).
105. Note again that the rule is based upon conduct that affects the well-being of the
child, not status of the parent.
106. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, §§ 2.11(1)(c), 2.13.
107. Id. § 2.08(2).
108. Id. at 204.
109. Id. at 5; see also Schneider, supra note 50, at 497.
110. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.11 cmt. c, at 205.
111. Id. § 2.11(2).
112. Id.
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substance, if responsibly made, will be honored in the reordering of
the child’s family. The Principles also manage to provide (4) protection for parents and for children from agreements that overreach or
mislead, and (5) an arbitral process should one be needed.
IV. “STRENGTHEN OR DECONSTRUCT?”
The Reporter approaches the conceptual challenge of rulemaking
in the area of child custody law by relying on a small number of key
principles. She sees that challenge as one “to provide determinate
and predictable outcomes that benefit children in the vast majority of
cases without imposing standardized solutions that offend this society’s commitment to pluralism and parental autonomy.”113 She relies
on four principles to achieve this goal: (1) post-separation allocations
of residential responsibility to each parent in approximate proportion
to caretaking by that parent prior to separation;114 (2) parenting plan
requirements “designed to transform proceedings about children at
divorce from win-lose battles over children into planning events, in
which roles for both parents are set forth and mechanisms for dealing
with future conflict are established”;115 (3) “greater deference to parental agreements than is allowed currently in most jurisdictions”;116
(4) “provisions to protect children and parents who have been victims of child or domestic abuse”;117 and (5) “the identification of individuals who are not legal parents but whose functional role as parents warrants an allocation of responsibility for the child in some
limited circumstances.”118 For purposes of this analysis of whether
chapter 2 is likely to strengthen families, the focus will be limited to
the first three of these principles. This is not to minimize the importance of the other two or to limit the scope of this analysis to the
principles less likely to be controversial. Rather, it is to focus on the
principles that have most immediately to do with the decisionmaking
process.
The transformation of proceedings about children at divorce into
113. Id., Reporter’s Memorandum, at xxiii.
114. Id. The Reporter notes that this principle runs throughout the draft, but is especially
important in section 2.09.
115. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, at xxiv (emphasis added)
(citing id. §§ 2.06, 2.11).
116. Id. (citing id. § 2.07).
117. Id. (citing id. §§ 2.06(2), 2.07(2), 2.08, 2.13).
118. Id. (citing id. §§ 2.03(3), 2.04, 2.21).
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planning events, and, in particular, the provisions in chapter 2 for
resolution of future disputes, represent a key to the prospects for
strengthening families in several respects. First, the provisions for
resolution of future disputes are critical to the function of future
child custody laws. They take the fundamental premise of the parenting plan (that “the preservation of existing child-parent attachments
after the break-up of a family unit is a critical factor in the child’s
well-being,” and that “each parent ordinarily will play an important
ongoing role in the child’s life”119) from rhetoric to action. In these
provisions, we see the Principles adding the channeling function (institutionalizing the fundamental premise of the parenting plan; creating “a pattern of expected action of individuals or groups enforced
by social sanctions, both positive and negative”)120 to the expressive
function (“imparting ideas through words and symbols”).121 Second,
the channeling of parents into institutionalized planning for changes
in the needs and circumstances of the child’s family and predictable,
structured decisionmaking options that are responsive to the needs
of a particular family creates what may be a necessary framework for
prospects of future cooperation in parenting. This is the “movement
toward better judgment” that Professor Mnookin hoped for in
1975, and it indicates that the Reporter has found that many of the
judges and decisionmakers on whom she relies are learning from the
process of decision.

A. Dispute Resolution and Game Theory
It may be instructive to consider the dispute resolution procedures set forth in chapter 2 by considering chapter 2 from the perspective of the study of decisionmaking strategies in the discipline of
behavioral science. In his book The Evolution of Cooperation,122
Professor Robert Axelrod considers how, in situations where each
individual has an incentive to be selfish, cooperation develops. Professor Axelrod proposes that there are strategies for conduct and the
regulation of conduct that transcend Hobbes’s world of selfish indi-

119. Id. at 8.
120. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, at 8. “[T]he channeling
function does not specifically require people to use these social institutions, although it may
offer incentives and disincentives for their use.” Id.
121. See Schneider, supra note 50, at 498.
122. ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984).
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viduals in which life is “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short.”123
He studies a basic social problem—situations in which “the pursuit
of self-interest by each leads to a poor outcome for all,”124 and considers a classic representation of such a situation, the Prisoner’s Dilemma game.125 Of the choices facing a player in the game, Professor
Axelrod states:
As long as the interaction is not iterated, cooperation is very difficult. That is why an important way to promote cooperation is to arrange that the same two individuals will meet each other again, and
to recall how the other has behaved until now. This continuing interaction is what makes it possible for cooperation based on reciprocity to be stable.126

In fact, the situation of parents dealing with custody of a child
is—or should be—more of a durable, iterated, non-zero-sum dispute. The parenting plan, as set forth in section 2.06 of the ALI
Principles, is intended, in the Reporter’s words, “to transform proceedings about children at divorce from win-lose battles over children into planning events, in which roles for both parents are set
forth and mechanisms for dealing with future conflicts are established.”127 This is child custody expressed as a non-zero-sum dispute.
To the extent that it succeeds in establishing a relationship between
parents that is responsive to the frequently changing needs of parents
and children, it expresses child custody as a durable, iterated nonzero-sum dispute.128
123. Id. at 4 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN pt. I, ch. 13, at 84 (Oxford Univ.
Press 1996) (1651)).
124. Id. at 7.
125. Id.
In the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, there are two players. Each has two choices,
namely to cooperate or defect. Each must make the choice without knowing what
the other will do. No matter what the other does, defection yields a higher payoff
than cooperation. The dilemma is that if both defect, both do worse than if both
had cooperated.
Id. To “defect” is to act in an exclusively self-interested, and therefore uncooperative, manner.
126. Id. at 125.
127. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, Reporter’s Memorandum,
at xxiv.
128. Id. § 2.02. Here the Principles act to facilitate the continuity of existing parent-child
attachments, see id. § 2.02(b), and to facilitate continuing meaningful contact between the
child and each parent, see id. § 2.02(c). See also section 2.11, which anticipates changes in the
needs and circumstances of parents and children, and presumptively involving both parents in
the process of planning for such changes and agreeing to an impasse mechanism should one be
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Professor Axelrod’s research indicates that reciprocity is the most
successful strategy in a long-term, non-zero-sum relationship. (Ideally, parenthood is such a relationship.) Applying game theory to
child custody, the rules of conduct for successful ongoing interaction
between parents concerning caretaking and decisionmaking responsibilities for their child would be as follows:
1. Cooperate as long as the other parent cooperates; defect if the
other parent defects.
2. Never defect first.
3. A parent should not rate success against the other parent’s
success; instead, rate success from the child’s perspective (parental cooperation is success), or from the perspective of another parent in identical circumstances.
4. Be as straightforward and predictable as possible.129
Because there are important consequences for others any time
one of the parents defects, the rules for parental interaction (such as
the parental plan or the dispute resolution procedure) cannot be allowed to take a laissez-faire approach to this process, trusting to each
parent’s fiduciary tendencies, enlightened self-interest, rational conduct, or even understanding of the strategic implications of one’s
conduct. How, then, can the strategic setting be altered to promote
cooperation between parents? Axelrod would suggest that cooperation would be promoted by (1) making the future more important,
relative to the present, (2) changing the payoffs, or consequences,
for each possible parental action, and (3) teaching parents (and others) particular values, facts, and skills relevant to cooperation in a
child custody dispute.130

B. Making the Future More Important
Axelrod states that “[m]utual cooperation can be stable if the future is sufficiently important relative to the present.”131 He notes that
one player in a Prisoner’s Dilemma scenario will typically take a
chance and defect because the player will conclude that the future
gain to be realized from cooperation is less attractive than the present gain. The preference for short-term gain is typically because the
needed.
129. See AXELROD, supra note 122, at 109–23.
130. Id. at 124.
131. Id. at 126.
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player perceives his relationship with the other player as fleeting—
not lasting beyond the present interaction—or because the player
prefers the benefit in hand to the idea of waiting for some benefit in
the future.132 In making rules to enhance cooperation between the
parties, the attractiveness of a defection in the short-term (in custody
terms, any self-interested act by one parent tending to undermine
the parents’ joint parenting of the child) can be lessened by ensuring
that the interaction between the parents is continual and by making
the future payoff more attractive than the present payoff. Axelrod
notes that this can be accomplished by making the interactions both
more durable and more frequent.
Durable interaction “allows patterns of cooperation which are
based on reciprocity to be worth trying and allows them to become
established.”133 Axelrod gives the example of soldiers on both sides
in the trenches during World War One developing cooperative relationships during lulls in the fighting. “They knew their interactions
would continue because nobody was going anywhere.”134 It is axiomatic in the study of negotiation that “[w]hen bargaining is repetitive, each disputant must be particularly concerned about his reputation, and hence, luckily for society, repetitive bargaining is often
done more cooperatively (and honestly) than single-shot bargaining.”135 Even if there is a high degree of hostility between parents,
each will develop a reputation with the other over time, and, therefore, each has an interest in protecting that reputation.136
The likelihood of a defection can also be diminished by increasing the frequency of the interactions between parents. Axelrod notes
that the sooner the next interaction between disputants, the larger it
132. Id.
133. Id. at 129.
134. AXELROD, supra note 122, at 129.
135. HOWARD RAIFFA, THE ART & SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 13 (1982).
136. The word “reputation,” as it is used in this context, has more to do with the predictability of interactions between parents than with their respective reputations in the community for honesty or cooperativeness. Raiffa goes on to point out that it is not always true
that the parties’ concern for their respective reputations in repetitive bargaining results in honest, cooperative bargaining.
[T]here is always the possibility that some inadvertent, careless friction can fester
and spoil the atmosphere for future bargaining; this is especially true where there are
differences in the information available to both sides. With repetition, a negotiator
might want to establish a reputation for toughness that is designed for long-term
rather than short-term rewards.
Id.
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looms in their respective consciousnesses.137 He suggests two effective ways of increasing the frequency of interactions. One is to keep
other parties away from the players so that a higher percentage of
each player’s interactions are with the other player.138 The other is to
break down the issues between the parties into small pieces—so that
many small reciprocal moves are required rather than one or two
large ones.139 The theory is that each small successful interaction between the players builds each player’s confidence in the process, invests each player in the accomplishments in hand, and provides each
player with information from which to predict the actions of the
other. Here Axelrod also addresses the common concern about
cheating, or breaching one’s duties under an agreement—an important consideration in child custody disputes. He points out that small
interactions over a long duration allow each party to reassure herself
or himself about breaches by the other with less at stake with each
potential breach.140
Chapter 2 of the ALI Principles would act to make the future
more important relative to the present for parents working at an
agreement on caretaking and decisionmaking responsibilities in several respects. First, the expressive function of the core concepts of
the parenting plan—that “the preservation of existing child-parent
attachments after the break-up of a family unit is a critical factor in
the child’s well-being,” and that “each parent ordinarily will play an
important ongoing role in the child’s life”—has been noted already.141 Again, the structured decisionmaking process set forth in
chapter 2 channels parents into a durable interaction. The durability
of that interaction is institutionalized by the planning process prescribed142 and by the provisions for resolution of future disputes set
forth in the chapter.143 The level of detail demanded by the parenting
plan144 provides for sharing of information between parents, thereby
137. See AXELROD, supra note 122, at 129.
138. Id. at 130.
139. Id. at 132.
140. Id. “Decomposing the interaction promotes the stability of cooperation by making
the gains from cheating on the current move less important relative to the gains from potential
mutual cooperation on later moves.” Id.
141. See supra text accompanying note 78.
142. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.06.
143. Id. §§ 2.08, 2.11.
144. Id. § 2.06(1)(a)–(h); see also § 2.06(3). Note particularly the provisions for defining
common ground in section 2.06(1)(h).
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reducing the likelihood of breaches of agreed-upon duties, and provides a textured background for frequent interactions over the term
of the child’s dependency. The family autonomy145 and structured
decisionmaking146 provisions in chapter 2 serve, in a sense, to keep
others—in this case the courts, and anyone else involved in the dispute resolution process who might undermine parental autonomy—
away from the “players.” Furthermore, the presumptions of sufficient
custodial responsibility to enable each parent to maintain a relationship with the child147 and the presumption that, if each of a child’s
legal parents has been exercising a reasonable share of parenting
functions, joint decisionmaking by the parents is in the child’s best
interests148 and paves the way for more frequent interactions between
parents.

C. Changing the Payoffs
This is where the State comes into the durable (iterated), nonzero-sum relationship between parents. It is where the expressive and
channeling functions of the law take precedence. Axelrod points out
that one of the primary functions of government is “to make sure
that when individuals do not have private incentives to cooperate,
they will be required to do the socially useful thing anyway.”149
When the costs of adhering to a particular standard of conduct are
direct and the benefits (or, in game theory language, the payoffs) are
diffuse, the chances of a party not adhering to the standard of conduct are high. Where adherence to the standard of conduct in question has high social utility, government is needed to step in and
make the choice of nonadherence to the standard of conduct (defection) less attractive. Government can take a heavy-handed approach
to this intervention,150 but it need not do so. In a durable (iterated)
interaction, there can still be a tension between the short-term incentive to defect and the long-term incentive to cooperate, as long as

145. Id. §§ 2.08, 2.11.
146. Id. §§ 2.07, 2.09 (particularly the approximation concept), 2.10, 2.13, and 2.14.
147. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.09(1)(a).
148. Id. § 2.10(2) and (4).
149. See AXELROD, supra note 122, at 133.
150. Id. at 134. “If the punishment for defection is so great that cooperation is the best
choice in the short run, no matter what the other player does, then there is no longer a dilemma.” Id.
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the latter is greater.151
In applying this theory to child custody dispute resolution, one
must ask three questions: (1) What would be the short-term incentive to defect?; (2) What would be the long-term incentive to cooperate?; and (3) How can the payoff be altered?
The short-term incentive to defect for parents in a child custody
dispute could be anything from retribution for real or imagined
slights in the dissolution of the marriage to attempts to woo the affections of the child in question.
As for long-term incentives to cooperate, one could accept the
premise put forth by Professor Scott, that “the sense of moral responsibility to one’s own children continues to be important to most
persons.”152 Alternatively, one could accept Professor Bartlett’s exhortations about “parental dispositions toward generosity and otherdirectedness.”153 While these may seem like Pollyanna sentiments,
particularly to hard-boiled practitioners of custody litigation, a
strong argument can be made that for many parents they represent
an ideal to be pursued whenever possible in their dealings with their
children.154 Long-term incentives to cooperate can also be less altruistic. If the parents come to appreciate that cooperation will be less
151. Id.
152. See Scott, supra note 12, at 91.
153. See Bartlett, supra note 54, at 294.
154. Notwithstanding Professor DiFonzo’s dismissal of “this assumption of enhanced
parental commitment surfacing after marital dissolution,” which he characterizes (quoting
Henry James) as “after being perfectly insignificant together . . . , [they] would be decidedly
striking apart.” James Herbie DiFonzo, Customized Marriage, 75 IND. L.J. 875, 931 n.332
(2000) (quoting HENRY JAMES, WHAT MAISIE KNEW 1–2 (1897)). See Professor Bartlett’s
discussion of the tension between parental rights and parental responsibilities, in which she
cites
Nel Nodding[s’] find[ing] [of] a basis for free action in our longing for caring and
relationship, which motivates us to do what we ought to do to maintain caring relationships. . . . Within the context of the parent-child relationship, Noddings’ concept of caring suggests that parents are free to (and should) bind themselves to act
according to their most ennobled sense of what parenthood requires. This binding
occurs within a social milieu which creates and sustains the ideals parents internalize
as part of their “ennobled selves.”
Bartlett, supra note 54, at 300–01. Bartlett goes on to conclude:
[t]he moral growth that comes from being held accountable for one’s actions, in
turn, derives at least in part from the perception that one’s actions are voluntary.
The choice to act morally is self-reinforcing, creating momentum for acting morally
on the next occasion, and the next, and strengthening the foundation upon which
future moral actions will be based.
Id.
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contentious, less expensive, less subjective,155 or more just, any or all
of these incentives can lead to cooperation.
As for altering the payoff, the Reporter is cautious about “the
limited role the law can effectively play in resolving disputes over the
care and control of children.”156 She notes that “[e]ven if there were
consensus on what parenting practices were best for children, parents
cannot be made to love their children, nor can they be supervised in
all of their encounters with them,”157 but goes on to state that “the
law can attempt to stimulate, or at least not inhibit, the motivations
of parents to do well by their children. It does this by respecting the
decisions parents have made about their children in the past and by
encouraging their planning for their children’s future.”158 It is here,
perhaps, that chapter 2 comes closest to falling short. Altering the
payoff may be accomplished either by increasing incentives for longterm cooperation159 or by increasing disincentives for short-term defection.160 It may be that out of deference for autonomous family decisionmaking the Reporter has been reluctant to bring the consequences for defection to the fore. In the following section on
teaching values, facts, and skills to alter the strategic setting and
promote cooperation between parents, the need for an effective impasse mechanism—and for its shadow in which to bargain161—
becomes more apparent.

155. See Bartlett, supra note 8, at 849.
156. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, at 16.
157. Id. at 26; see also id. §§ 2.08, 2.11.
158. Id. at 26 (emphasis added).
159. Id. Attempts to increase incentives for long-term cooperation can be seen in the expressions of the importance of continuing involvement of both parents in the child’s life. See
id. §§ 2.02 (Objectives), 2.06 (Parenting Plan), 2.07 (Parental Agreements), 2.08 (CourtOrdered Services), 2.09 (Custodial Responsibility), 2.10 (Decisionmaking Responsibility).
There are also incentives for long-term cooperation inherent in the perception, should it develop as intended, that the parenting plan approach is less expensive, less contentious, more
fair, etc.
160. Id. at 26. In a durable interaction, such as that provided under the parenting plan
provisions in sections 2.06 and 2.11, reciprocity provides a disincentive for short-term defection. See AXELROD, supra note 130.
161. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 39.
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D. Teaching Values, Facts, and Skills
1. Values
Axelrod focuses upon the social ideal of altruism, which he defines as “the phenomenon of one person’s utility being positively affected by another person’s welfare.”162 He discusses the desirability
of one generation of a society shaping the values of the next generation so that the next generation will consider the welfare of others as
well as their own welfare.163 He notes that “altruism can be sustained
through socialization.”164 He considers the benefits of altruism both
in terms of real life as well as game theory: “[A] society of such caring people will have an easier time attaining cooperation among its
members, even when caught in an iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma.”165
This teaching of values could take any of a number of forms. It
could refer to programs in schools that teach about human interaction with the aim of increasing civility.166 It could refer to parenting
programs that teach parents to aspire to conduct conforming with
their best hopes rather than their worst fears.167 Or it could simply

162. See AXELROD, supra note 122, at 135; see also Bartlett, supra note 8.
163. See AXELROD, supra note 122, at 135.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See, e.g., Wendy Schwartz, Developing Social Competence in Children, at
http://iume.tc.columbia.edu/choices/briefs/choices03.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2001); Nel
Noddings, Learning to Care and to Be Cared For, in SCHOOLS, VIOLENCE, AND SOCIETY
185–98 (Allan M. Hoffman ed., 1996).
167. Note that ALI Principles section 2.08 calls for the court to inform parents about
“the impact of family dissolution on children and how the needs of children facing family dissolution can be best addressed.” PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, §
2.08. Comment a to section 2.08 envisions parenting education programs that would “not
only facilitate the process of reaching mutual agreement for the benefit of the child but also
give the parents additional insight about their children’s special needs during a period that is
often extraordinarily upsetting and unstable.” Id. at 93; see also Sarah H. Ramsey, HighConflict Custody Cases: Reforming the System for Children, 39 FAM. C. REV. 146 (2001);
Andrew Schepard, Parental Conflict Prevention Programs and the Unified Family Court: A
Public Health Perspective, 32 FAM. L.Q. 95, 109 n.34 (1998) (“The Association of Family
and Conciliation Courts published a Directory of Parent Education Programs in 1997 containing program names, addresses and basic organizational information. The Directory is available
from AFCC at 329 W. Wilson Street, Madison, Wisconsin 53703.”); Joan B. Kelly, The Determination of Child Custody in the USA, at http://www.wwlia.org/us-cus4.htm (last modified July 30, 1997) (“Whether they are in dispute or not, educational programs designed to
provide divorcing parents with information about the impact of divorce on children, the effects
of conflict on their children, how to keep their children out of their conflicts, and information
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refer to the expressive function of the dispute resolution system. The
parenting plan in chapter 2 has a complex altruistic premise that has
been mentioned repeatedly elsewhere in this article.168 The Reporter
notes that meaningful contact between a child and both parents ordinarily is good for the child’s development and sense of identity, as
well as for the nonresidential parent, who also will be more likely to
feel a continued responsibility to contribute to the child in financial
support and otherwise than one who lacks all contact with the
child.169 These are key instances of the expressive function—the
teaching of values—built into chapter 2.
Axelrod also notes the danger of individuals who “receive the
benefits of another’s altruism” but do “not pay the welfare costs of
being generous in return.”170 He suggests that this cost of altruism
can be controlled “by being altruistic to everyone at first, and thereafter only to those who show similar feelings.”171 This leads to the
need to alter the strategy by teaching facts.

2. Facts
Axelrod’s research demonstrates that in a durable, non-zero-sum
relationship, reciprocity is the most effective strategy. He evaluates
many different strategies that have been tried in contest with a strict
reciprocal strategy172 and describes unvarying success for a reciprocal
strategy. While this might appear to be a somewhat inappropriate
approach where the physical, emotional, psychological, social, and
even spiritual and moral well-being of children is at stake, Axelrod
regarding various custodial and parenting arrangements are important. Such programs can be
offered through nonprofit agencies in communities, through churches, or can be sponsored by
the courts. Good resource and training materials incorporating written, video, and discussion
elements have been developed that ensure balanced, comprehensive programs. While it would
be optimal if all divorcing parents could participate in these brief programs, it should be required of all parents disputing custody or access prior to entering mediation or initiating litigation.”); see also Department of Conciliation Services, Washington County, Oregon, My spouse
and I are divorcing, at http://www.co.washington.or.us/deptmts/juvenile/divorce.htm (last
modified Jan. 19, 2001); Cooperative Parenting for Divided Families, at http://trfn.
clpgh.org/cpdf (last modified May 15, 2001); California Courts Self-Help Center, General
Advice for Creating Parenting Plans and Parenting After a Divorce or Separation, at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp/family/custody/advice (last visited Sept. 21, 2001).
168. See supra note 79.
169. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.02 cmt. f, at 27.
170. AXELROD, supra note 122, at 135.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 118–20.
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makes a convincing case that the Golden Rule—a rule calling for altruistic behavior toward the other in the hope of reciprocity—“can
not only hurt you, but it can hurt other innocent bystanders,”173
such as the children at issue. “Unconditional cooperation tends to
spoil the other player; it leaves a burden on the rest of the community to reform the spoiled player, suggesting that reciprocity is a better foundation for morality than is unconditional cooperation.”174
Reciprocity, according to Axelrod, is an effective strategy in a durable, iterated, non-zero-sum relationship not because it achieves triumph over the other player, but because it elicits cooperation from
the other player.175 It does so “by promoting the mutual interest
rather than by exploiting the other’s weakness.”176 In other words,
properly taught, a parent learns not to win (as in a zero-sum game),
but to “win-win”—to cooperate. To this end, Axelrod would suggest teaching parents the rules of conduct set forth above to help
channel the parties through the process, to help the community enforce its expectations for the process, and to help make the law more
effective in eliciting cooperation in the process:
1. Cooperate as long as the other parent cooperates; defect if the
other parent defects.
2. Never defect first.
3. A parent should not rate success against the other parent’s
success; instead, rate success from the child’s perspective (parental cooperation is success), or from the perspective of another parent in identical circumstances.
4. Be as straightforward and predictable as possible.
Parents should be taught, then, under the provisions for courtordered services in section 2.08, how to negotiate with one another.
Courts could provide for programs that empower parents by explicitly teaching them that reciprocity in a durable, iterated, non-zerosum relationship promotes cooperation. This principle would certainly not be lost on the family law bar, which has long seen itself as
having a responsibility to educate its clients.
Axelrod acknowledges one danger of reciprocity that must be
considered in the context of any interaction having to do with an

173.
174.
175.
176.
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event as potentially emotionally charged as the dissolution of a marriage: the danger of a spiral of mutual defection, or feud. But he
notes that, “in situations where people can rely on a central authority
to enforce the community standards . . . by guaranteeing the punishment of any individual who tries to be less than cooperative, the
deviant strategy will not thrive, and will not provide an attractive
model for others to imitate.”177 In the context of child custody dispute resolution, the term “punishment” must be read to mean the
creation of disincentives for parents inclined to defect from the process. Axelrod is clear, and common sense and experience support the
idea, that when parties are at an impasse in the process, a “central authority” may have to be called upon “to enforce the community
standards.”178 What is perhaps needed in chapter 2, in order to address such deviant strategies and the impasses resulting from them
while remaining true to the principles family interdependence informing and inspiring chapter 2,179 is a dispute resolution process
with an impasse mechanism that would reflect and reinforce that interdependence. Chapter 2 interposes a brilliant array of alternatives
to “win-lose battles over children.”180 What is perhaps needed to implement chapter 2 effectively is an explicit reference to a dispute
resolution procedure that would incorporate its principles without
having to resort to the inadequacies of adjudication.181

3. Skills
Here Axelrod addresses the ability of one player to recognize another particular player from the past and to summon up that player’s
past conduct to inform the current negotiations.182 As this relates to
child custody decisionmaking, it involves the knowledge and experience aspects of skill. A parent must first be able to take what she has
learned about how cooperation works in a durable, non-zero-sum
(parental) relationship and then factor in his or her experiences with
177. Id. at 138.
178. Id.
179. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, at xxiv.
180. Id.
181. Id. § 2.02 cmt. b, at 31. This reference is to another article by the author: Accounting to Ourselves for Ourselves: An Analysis of Adjudication in the Resolution of Child Custody
Disputes, 71 NEB. L. REV. 1228 (1992). See the proposal for a negotiatory impasse mechanism at page 1266.
182. AXELROD, supra note 122, at 140.
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the other parent, with the child, and with the legal system. This
process results in the development of skills for use throughout the
duration of the relationship. “[T]he scope of sustainable cooperation
can be expanded by any improvements in the players’ abilities to recognize each other from the past, and to be confident about the prior
actions that actually have been taken.”183 Applying this theory to
child custody dispute resolution, parents must learn the skill of recognition of successful coparenting across the seeming chasm of divorce or estrangement. They must learn to measure success in terms
of effective cooperation between two disparate approaches to parenting the same child. They must learn to distinguish between an oversight, or false-step, and a breach of faith with the cooperative parenting process. They must learn to build a re-ordered relationship
around the emerging history of successes and failures in that relationship, and they must learn the value of behaving predictably in that
relationship. They must learn to value and respect the autonomy of
the re-ordered family as they valued and insisted upon the autonomy
of the intact family.
Chapter 2 is uniquely well-suited to teaching the participants
these skills. Its emphasis on predictability, structured decisionmaking
(and particularly the concept of approximation), family autonomy,
and planning for the future of the child’s family provide a forum for
the use of these skills and provide incentives for their use.184 Its provisions for structured decisionmaking and future planning in particular allow for the teaching of these skills.185 The semantic and conceptual changes in chapter 2186 are indicative of an approach that would
seek, through the expressive and channeling functions of the law, to
teach parents not to measure their success against the other parent’s

183. Id.
184. See supra text accompanying note 82.
185. PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, §§ 2.06, 2.08, 2.09 (particularly the approximation concept), 2.10, 2.13, 2.14.
186. One comment describes a key change in terminology. Id. § 2.03 cmt. d, at 47. Another key conceptual change is seen in the parenting plan put forward in section 2.06, which is
described in comment a as (1) “encourag[ing] [parents] to anticipate their children’s needs
and make arrangements for them”; (2) “locat[ing] responsibility for the welfare of children in
parents rather than in courts”; (3) “presuppos[ing][] and affirm[ing][] a diversity of childrearing arrangements”; (4) “encourag[ing] parents to customize their arrangements to take account of the family’s own actual circumstances”; and (5)—though “not intended to be onerous”—ask[ing] more of parents than is traditionally required. Id. § 2.06 cmt a, at 66–67
(emphasis added).
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success, but instead to recognize success from the perspective of the
relationship, or that of the child, or from the perspective of any parent in her or his exact circumstances. Axelrod’s approach would suggest the implementation of procedures or programs under section
2.08 that would explicitly communicate these skills to parents and
would help parents learn that it is in their long-term interest to discipline themselves to be as straightforward and predictable as possible
in their dealings concerning custody of the child.
V. CONCLUSION
In the past twenty-five years, we have learned much about the
legal system of decision concerning parental relationships with children. At the same time, behavioral scientists have learned much
about the process of decision and about the problem of cooperation
in particular. Chapter 2 of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family
Dissolution, with its emphasis on the parenting plan, has moved
boldly away from much of what is problematic or counterproductive
to the process of decision in parenting. It embraces much of what we
have learned (and are learning) works for families and children. And
it has laid the groundwork for a move away from child custody adjudication—a process that has proven largely ineffective and unresponsive to the needs of “dissolving” families. Should the concept of the
parenting plan be embraced by more state legislatures,187 the next
twenty-five years will likely see a shift away from the troublesome application of judicial discretion to parent-child relationships and toward creative uses of education, negotiation, and planning in reordering those relationships.

187. For a list of states that currently have some form of parenting plan in effect, see
PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft No. 3, pt. I), supra note 34, § 2.06 cmts. a–b, at 74–79.
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